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Introduction
A household is Ricardian if intergenerational altruistic linkages are operative within the household and if it fully understands the government ¶s budget constraint. Ricardian households offset any changes in the timing of taxes with intergenerational transfers (Ricardo, 1820, reprinted in 1951 Barro, 1974) . So, for example, an increase in budget de¿cits or pay-as-you-go Social Security spending would be offset by larger transfers from parents to their children a move toward a funded Social Security system would be offset by smaller transfers, possibly negative (that is, gifts from children to their parents). As a result, these otherwise important ¿scal policies are effectively irrelevant if the Ricardian assumption accurately describes many households. It is not surprising, therefore, that Ricardian equivalence has generated a lively debate during the past several decades. See, for example, the literature reviews in Bernheim (1987) , Weil (1989) , Seater (1993) , Barro (1996) , Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) , and Smetters (1999) .
While many economists do not believe that Ricardian equivalence is a close description of reality, 1 the actual empirical evidence is mixed. Extensive empirical work by Evans (1985 Evans ( , 1987a Evans ( , 1987b ) in papers he wrote before modern extensive panel data sets became widely available shows that different aggregate variables seem fairly invariant over time to changes in the levels of government debt, consistent with Ricardian equivalence. However, Feldstein (1982, 1996) and Evans (1998) show that aggregate U.S. consumption might be substantially affected by the levels of unfunded U.S. Social Security net wealth, inconsistent with Ricardian equivalence. Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) , Lesnoy and Leimer (1985) , and Congressional Budget Of¿ce (1998), though, argue that Social Security time-series estimates are quite sensitive to how the Social Security wealth variable is constructed. Seater (1993) reviews many other empirical tests, both supportive and not supportive of Ricardian equivalence. He notes that while some of those indirect tests using aggregated data might lack power (as veri¿ed by Cardia, 1997) , the sheer number of tests failing to reject Ricardian equivalence provides some support of the Ricardian proposition as an approximation, assuming that the power of the different tests is fairly orthogonal.
Household-level data sets have become more widely available in the past decade or so, thereby allowing for a more direct test of the altruism tenet underlying Ricardian equivalence. Tomes (1981) and Bernheim (1991) ¿nd some evidence in favor of the altruism model. Papers by Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992 , 1997 use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. They ¿nd some evidence of intergenerational transfers consistent with the altruism model, but only a little. For example, AHK (1997) show that redistributing $1 from a recipient child to donor parents leads to less than a $0.13 increase in the intergenerational transfer from parent to child, much less than the $1 transfer implied by the altruism model. 2 Wilhelm (1996) , using federal estate tax return data, also ¿nds little evidence that bequests compensate for earnings differences between parents and children. Most recently, Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (1999) and Cox (2001) ¿nd evidence of risk sharing in developing economies, although short of the strong predictions of the altruism model. Page (forthcoming) ¿nds evidence that intergenerational transfers made by many households are sensitive to differences in tax rates across U.S. states, consistent with the Ricardian model. In sum, the household-level evidence seems to suggest some risk sharing, but not as strongly as that predicted by the standard altruistic model.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the low level of risk sharing observed between parent households and child households is not necessarily inconsistent with Ricardian equivalence. We built a two-sided altruistic-linkage model in which private transfers are made in the presence of two types of shocks: an ³observable´shock that is public information among households (for example, public redistribution) and an ³unobservable´shock that is private information (for example, idiosyncratic wages). Parents and children observe each other ¶s total income but not each other ¶s endogenous level of labor market effort. Hence, a risk-sharing arrangement contingent on effort level (the ¿rst-best solution) is not possible. In the second-best solution, unobservable shocks are only partially shared due to moral hazard. 2 Other authors have regressed consumption growth on income growth in order to test for the presence of risk sharing outside of the family. See Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991) , and Townsend (1994) . AltuÙ g and Labadie (1994) discuss the empirical methodology in detail.
But, at the same time, observable shocks (for example, tax timing changes) will be fully shared, due to interdependent utility, provided that the utility function satis¿es a condition derived herein. As a result, our model can reproduce the low degree of risk sharing found in recent studies, but Ricardian equivalence still holds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic principal-agent model between parents and their children. Section 3 demonstrates how familial risk-sharing arrangements distort work incentives (that is, create moral hazard) when ¿rst-best arrangements are not possible. Section 4 formally derives the ¿rst-best and second-best optimal risk-sharing arrangements. Section 5 presents some examples of utility functions in which Ricardian equivalence holds in the presence of a potentially low level of observed risk sharing. Section 6 discusses the interdependence of the risk-sharing arrangements for observable and unobservable shocks in the second-best equilibrium. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Model

Income Shocks and Risk-Sharing Arrangements
Consider two altruistic households, l 5 i4> 5j, for example, parents and children. Each household places the same weight on each other ¶s utility equal to !, 3 ! 4, and receives two types of income shocks, v and w . The shock v is an idiosyncratic income shock to household l that is unobservable to the other household, l. The shock w is a government tax transfer to household l that is observable to both households. The ³pretax´labor income | of household l (that is, before observable shocks) is de¿ned as the sum of its unobservable effort level (³hours worked´), k , and unobservable shock v , that is,
The sum | is observable, but its components are not independently observable, prohibiting ¿rst-best risk sharing. 3 For simplicity, households 1 and 2 receive symmetric shocks²that is, household l receives v and w , and household l receives v ! @ v and w ! @ w .
Hence, those shocks are always insurable within two households. The cumulative probability distributions for v and w , I +v , and J +w ,, are independent and symmetric around zero. 4 So, H +v , @ H +w , @ 3=
Both types of shocks can be shared among households. Let 5^3> 3=8`be the risksharing plan for unobservable shocks v . In particular, is equal to the proportion of the unobservable shock, v ^v!`, that is shared by the other household, l^l`. The income of household l after risk sharing, therefore, is de¿ned as
where we used the fact that v ! @ v . The risk-sharing plan @ 3 indicates no risk sharing, while @ 3=8 indicates perfect risk sharing (equal division of income).
Similarly, let 5^3> 3=8`denote the risk-sharing plan for the observable shock w . In particular, is equal to the proportion of the observable shock, w ^w!`, that is shared by the other household, l^l`. The amount of the observable shock borne by household l after risk sharing, therefore, is
where we used the fact that w ! @ w . Similarly, the risk-sharing plan @ 3 indicates no risk sharing, and @ 3=8 indicates full risk sharing. The notation for the model is summarized in Table 1 .
The Timing of the Model
The timing of the households ¶ actions is as follows:
1. Two households determine the risk-sharing plan +> , based on the distributions of the shocks, I +v , and J +w ,, and the degree of altruism ! that is part of their utility function (shown below) 2. Each household decides its working hours (effort level), k and k ! Observable shock to household l ¶s resources +w @ w ! , 5^3> 3=8`Proportion of unobservable shock, v ^v!`, shared by household l^l 5^3> 3=8`Proportion of observable shock, w ^w!`, shared by household l^lÌ +v , 5^3> 4`Cumulative probability distribution for the unobserved shock v J +w , 5^3> 4`Cumulative probability distribution for the observed shock 
The Household Problem and Optimal Effort,
Altruism between parents and children is two-sided. The two households place an equal weight, !, on each other ¶s utility, where ! @ 4 indicates full altruism and ! @ 3 indicates no altruism. The household l ¶s problem is 
.
The ¿rst-order condition with respect to k is
By the symmetric assumption, the expected utilities of the two households are the same, that is,
So, we have
Moreover, the optimal working hours of the two households are the same, that is,
and the optimal working hours, k +> > !> I +v ,> J+w ,,, solve
H x , +k . +4 5, v . +4 5 , w > 4 k, @ 3=
The Impact of Risk Sharing on Effort
Although it is dif¿cult to solve for k analytically since we have not yet speci¿ed a utility function, this section characterizes how the optimal working hours vary with the risk-sharing plan, +> ,. Toward this end, we make some standard assumptions about the utility function.
Utility is assumed to be increasing in the level of the consumption of goods and leisure but at a decreasing rate (x S A 3, x , A 3, x SS ? 3, x ,, ? 3) the marginal utility of consumption and leisure might be separable or nonseparable provided that it is nondecreasing in the level of the other (x S, @ x ,S 3) but at a nonincreasing rate (x SS, @ x S,S @ x ,SS 3 x ,,S @ 
Since x SS ? 3, x ,, ? 3, and x S, @ x ,S 3, the denominator on the right-hand side becomes strictly negative. We now want to prove that the numerator is positive. Since the two types of shocks are normalized to be independent, then Discussion. Comparing the last two lemmas, notice that the relationship between the level of effort, k, and the amount of observable risk that is shared, , is similar to the response of effort to the amount of nonobservable shock that is shared, , under full altruism (! @ 4). Intuitively, there is no private information contained in observable shocks and when shocks are unobservable, there is no desire to take advantage of the private information when altruism is full. Hence, in both cases, the direct role of moral hazard is not present. However, notice from equation (8) that gk@g is not independent of unless x SSS @ x ,SS @ 3 (that is, unless agents are not prudent). In other words, the change in the effort level in response to a change in cannot be determined independently from since also affects the optimal choice for k. The interdependence of and is discussed in Section 6.
The Optimal Risk-Sharing Arrangement Ejc
This section derives the ¿rst-best and second-best optimal risk-sharing arrangements +> ,.
As proven below, if ¿rst-best risk-sharing arrangements were available (that is, all shocks were observable), then shocks would be fully insurable. Similarly, full insurance is optimal in the second-best equilibrium provided that agents are fully altruistic +! @ 4,. In both of those cases, moral hazard does not exist because either agents have no private information (as in the ¿rst-best equilibrium) or agents have no incentive to take advantage of their private information (as with full altruism).
In the more general case, when private information exists and altruism is not full, +! ? 4,, moral hazard becomes relevant. The optimal risk-sharing arrangement, therefore, must balance the bene¿ts of risk sharing against the costs of moral hazard. Moral hazard prevents full risk sharing. Still, we demonstrate that observable shocks will be fully shared provided that preferences satisfy a condition that we derive. In other words, Ricardian equivalence can hold in the presence of incomplete risk sharing. The ¿rst-order conditions are
Lemma 3 The optimal risk-sharing arrangement +> , solves the following set of equa-tions:
Use of the ¿rst-order condition for k, or equation (5), to eliminate H x , from the above equations produces equations (9) and (10).
First-Best Risk Sharing
The previous lemma nests the solutions to the ¿rst-best and second-best equilibrium. To get the ¿rst-best equilibrium, we can simply normalize v @ 3 to remove the unobservable shock, leaving only the observable shock. 7
Proposition 4 With only observable shocks +v @ 3,, risk is fully shared (that is, @ 3=8).
Proof. If there are no unobservable shocks, (v @ 3), no risk sharing based on the labor income | and | ! is needed, that is, @ 3. Hence, equation (10) 
Second-Best Risk Sharing
We now derive the second-best risk-sharing arrangements in the presence of unobservable shocks, that is, when I +v , is not degenerate. We ¿rst consider the case of full altruism, +! @ 4,> followed by the more general case of nonfull altruism, +! ? 4,.
Full Altruism +! @ 4,
Proposition 5 When two households are fully altruistic to each other, perfect insurance
is optimal for both unobservable and observable shocks, that is, ! @ 4 @, + 9 > 9 , @ +3=8> 3=8,.
Proof. When ! @ 4, the ¿rst-order conditions, (9) and (10) (9) becomes
which contradicts equality with zero. When @ 3=8,
again contradicting equality with zero. Since the left-hand side of equation (9) is continuous for all 5^3> 3=8`, the optimal that satis¿es equation (9) exists and 9 5 +3> 3=8,. Moreover, since the left-hand side of equation (9) is positive at @ 3 and it is negative at @ 3=8, then the second-order requirement for a maximum is also satis¿ed. 
where @ 4 . ! . 8 Of course, the necessary and suf¿cient conditions for Ricardian equivalence are that equations (9) and (10) hold with 9 ' fD and j
fD
Proof. Similar to the proof for Lemma 1, it can be shown that @ 3=8 implies H^x SS w `@ H^x ,S w `@ H^x S w `@ 3. From equation (8), k @ 3. Thus the ¿rst-order condition (10) holds for all 5^3> 3=8`. The ¿rst-order conditions, (9) and (10), along with equations (7) and (8) 
Proof. By assumption, H^x ,S v `@ H^x ,S w `@ 3. From Proposition 7, the inequality (12) is a suf¿cient condition for 9 @ 3=8= Corollary 9 (Existence of + 9 > 9 ,) If condition (11) or (12) holds, then a second-best risksharing arrangement, + 9 > 9 ,, exists in which Ricardian equivalence holds despite the presence of imperfect risk sharing +3 ? 9 ? 3=8> 9 @ 3=8,.
Discussion. Two observations are in order. First, notice that degree of altruism does not play an important role in the ¿rst-best equilibrium, but it does play an important role in the second-best equilibrium. As emphasized by Barro (1974 Barro ( , 1996 , the degree of altruism itself is not critical for Ricardian equivalence to hold in the standard deterministic altruisticlinkage model or, similarly, in the ¿rst-best equilibrium in the case of uncertainty. As long as altruism is strong enough for intergenerational transfers (in either direction) to be operative, all shocks will be fully shared between parents and their children in the ¿rst-best equilibrium.
In the second-best equilibrium, however, the degree of altruism plays a critical role in limiting the degree to which unobservable shocks are shared. Only if altruism is full, +! @ 4,> will all shocks be fully shared in the second-best equilibrium because only then do parents and children not have the incentive to take advantage of their private information. When altruism is less than full, +! ? 4,, only observable shocks will be fully shared in equilibrium.
Second, the inequality (11) or (12) is not strong enough to rule out the possibility of multiple second-best equilibria. Stronger conditions on the utility function are required to ensure uniqueness. We do not derive the conditions required for uniqueness in this paper because that issue is both quite complicated and unnecessary for our purposes. (The next section, however, does provide several examples of preferences for which the equilibrium is unique.)
Even if multiple equilibria exist for a particular utility function, the above analysis proves that risk sharing will be incomplete at each equilibrium however, Ricardian equivalence still holds for any utility function satisfying (11) or (12).
Examples: Quadratic, CARA, and CRRA
The previous section demonstrated that the second-best level of risk sharing for the unobservable shock is generally less than full (except when ! @ 4) but that the observable shock might be fully shared, that is, Ricardian equivalence holds in the presence of incomplete household risk sharing. The suf¿cient condition (12) holds with equality.
Example 12 (Conjecture) When the utility function is separable and its consumption part is one of constant relative risk aversion with the coef¿cient of relative risk aversion 3, full
insurance for an observable shock is optimal, that is, 9 @ 3=8.
Discussion. The CRRA example above is labeled a ³conjecture´because closed-form solutions are not possible with CRRA utility. Instead, we constructed a computer program (written in Maple and run with 30 digits precision) that used a grid search algorithm to solve for the global optimum, + 9 > 9 , 5^3> 3=8`^3> 3=8`, for a given set of utility parameters. This grid search algorithm was then run over a large range of utility parameters. In each case, 9 @ 3=83. Table 2 presents some illustrative numerical results for the CRRA speci¿cation:
, Q! ! , where is set to unity. Obviously, this example is not intended to be a carefully calibrated numerical experiment. Rather, our intention was to demonstrate the role of the risk aversion parameter, , in determining the optimal risk-sharing arrangement, + 9 > 9 ,.
Notice that 9 @ 3=83 in each case, that is, the observable shock is always fully shared.
Notice also that the 9 is increasing in . One reason that 9 increases is that moral hazard becomes less important at higher levels of in particular, agents that are very prudent have less incentive to try to free ride off the risk sharing provided by the other agent. To see why, recall that agent l ¶s pretax income is | @ k .v . Less free riding (that is, higher k ) reduces agent l ¶s probability of suffering from a low value of | after the unobservable shock v is realized. As a result, more risk can be optimally shared among more prudent agents, since they are less likely to try to take advantage of it. Another reason that 9 increases in is that the utility value of risk sharing increases in . As a result, the balance between controlling moral hazard and providing risk sharing shifts toward more risk sharing as the value of increases.
The Joint Determination of and j in the Second-Best Economy
Thus far, we have proven that (i) all shocks will be fully shared in the ¿rst-best economy, whereas (ii) the nonobservable shock will only be partially shared in the second-best economy. Both of those results were proven to hold provided that the derivatives, crossderivatives, and higher-order derivatives of the utility function satisfy some fairly general conditions that were stated in the beginning of Section 2. We then showed that (iii) the observable shock may be fully shared in the second-best equilibrium. However, in proving result (iii), we speci¿ed an additional suf¿cient condition, (11) . The presence of that additional condition leads to an interesting question: why wasn ¶t an extra suf¿cient condition used to demonstrate full risk sharing in the ¿rst-best economy, result (i)? In other words, if a shock is fully observable, does it really matter if nonobservable shocks are also present, as in the second-best economy? In still other words, why doesn ¶t result (iii) immediately follow from results (i) and (ii), thereby allowing us to avoid the additional suf¿cient condition (11) that we used to prove result (iii)? This section answers those questions by demonstrating the interdependence of 9 and 9 in the second-best economy whenever agents are prudent.
As noted in Section 2, equation (8) shows that gk@g is not independent of unless x SSS @ x ,SS @ 3 (that is, unless agents are not prudent). As a result, we generally cannot set 9 and 9 independently of each other in the second-best economy (unless agents are not prudent). In contrast, all shocks can, of course, be independently shared in the ¿rst-best economy where complete contracting is available.
We now illustrate the joint determination of 9 and 9 in the second-best economy using the CRRA example considered in the previous section with @ 3=8. Table 3 reports the agent ¶s level of effort, k, and utility, x, at the second-best equilibrium tuple + 9 > 9 , @ +3=83> 3=37, as well as at two nonequilibrium values of +> ,. Of course, the highest level of utility is at the second-best equilibrium point, which is marked in Table 3 with asterisks (*). But now consider the other two nonequilibrium tuples where the level of risk sharing for the unobservable shock is set above its optimal level (that is, A 9 ). Notice that the tuple +> , @ +3=83> 3=83,, where both shocks are fully shared, generates less effort and lower utility than the tuple +> , @ +3=33> 3=83,> where the observable shock is not shared at all.
In other words, the ³third-best´(that is, constrained) outcome does not necessarily fully share the observable shock when the unobservable shock is being shared too much relative to its second-best level. The reason is prudence. When A 9 , too much of the unobservable risk is being shared, so the level of effort exerted by each household is below its optimal level. Setting ? 3=83, therefore, forces households to accept more risk associated with the observable shock and, hence, exert more effort, thereby reducing the moral hazard problem associated with sharing the unobservable shock.
In sum, the values of 9 and 9 cannot be determined independently in the secondbest economy in the presence of prudent agents. The suf¿cient condition (11) guarantees, though, that observable shocks will be fully shared at equilibrium. That suf¿cient condition is not needed in the ¿rst-best equilibrium where it is always ef¿cient to share a given risk, independent of how other risks are shared.
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that Ricardian equivalence can hold even in the presence of incomplete risk sharing between parents and their children. Moral hazard prevents unobservable idiosyncratic shocks from being fully shared. Still, observable shocks, including changes in the timing of taxes, might be fully shared at equilibrium, that is, Ricardian equivalence holds.
Ricardian equivalence is proven to hold under a suf¿cient condition derived herein. We considered several speci¿cations for preferences in which Ricardian equivalence holds, including separable quadratic, separable CARA, and separable CRRA. (Closed-form solutions are not available in the CRRA case, so we can only conjecture that Ricardian equivalence holds on the basis of numerical simulations.) Future work could extend our results to an even larger class of utility functions, although we found it dif¿cult to obtain closed-form solutions for cases beyond separable quadratic and separable CARA. Future empirical work using linked household-level data could also attempt to distinguish between nonobservable and observable shocks, such as Social Security reforms. Performing such estimation, however, would be quite challenging at present modern data sets do not yet span a long enough period containing many policy shocks, such as changes in Social Security bene¿t levels. In other work in its preliminary stage, we are exploring how a principal-agent model with moral hazard might also be useful in explaining the ³equal bequest puzzle´that has been receiving more attention recently (for example, McGarry, 1999 Bernheim and Severinov, forthcoming).
